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A CHIP OFF THE OLD BLOCK:
COPYRIGHT LAW AND THE
SEMICONDUCTOR CHIP
PROTECTION ACT*t
I.

INTRODUCTION

Approximately 170 years elapsed between the time the framers of
the Constitution gave Congress the power to "Promote the Progress of
Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and
Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries" 1 and the invention in 1958-59 of the semiconductor chip ("chip") by
Jack St. Clair Kilby and Robert Noyce.2 The framers preferred to give
Congress the power to create intellectual property rights, rather than
enumerate the rights in the Constitution, because scientists and authors
of the future would be using techniques of which even the science-conscious thinkers of the 18th century could not conceive.
In the years since its invention, the chip has become a key component in devices ranging from consumer appliances to large-scale manufacturing components. As revenues from chip sales increased, the
incentives for unscrupulous people to copy a successful chip and market
the copy as an original also increased dramatically.3 The American chip
manufacturers were faced with the loss of billions of dollars. Many of
these manufacturers had either watched or had survived numerous battles with software pirates; and an unclear interpretation of the Copyright Law4 was their only weapon. American chip manufacturers
appealed to Congress, which, after several false starts, enacted the
Semiconductor Chip Protection Act ("Chip Act"). 5 President Reagan
* National Second Place, Third Annual Computer Law Writing Competition.
© Frederic M. Wflf. All rights reserved.
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
Reid, The Chip, SCIENCE, Jan.-Feb. 1985, at 32, 40-41.
H.R. REP. No. 781, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 1, reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS 5750. This is the legislative history of the Act which, unfortunately, does
not fully reflect all of the last-minute changes, such as the addition of sections 913-914 and
the renumbering of some subsections.
4. 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-802 (1982 & Supp. III 1985).
5. Semiconductor Chip Protection Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-620, § 302, 98 Stat.
3335, 3347 (codified at 17 U.S.C. §§ 901-914 (Supp. III 1985)).
t
1.
2.
3.
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signed the bill into law on November 8, 1984.
The Chip Act resolves a number of problems. First and foremost, it
gives chip designers and manufacturers protection in the form of legal
rights and remedies against those who infringe upon a registered design. 6 Second, it creates a sui generis form of intellectual property pro7
tection separate and distinct from either patent or copyright law.
Third, the Chip Act is similar enough to copyright law in both expression and intent that copyright law may be used by analogy in the courts
until a separate body of chip law is developed.8 Finally, the existence of
the Chip Act relieves both Congress and the courts from the burden of
stretching the copyright statute to cover chips. 9
This Note examines the Chip Act in light of the needs and
problems of the semiconductor industry, thus providing a market-oriented approach.1 0 The framework for this analysis is a case filed by
NEC Corporation against Intel Corporation (NEC v. Intel).1 Because
the chips at issue in NEC v. Intel are too old to receive protection under
the new act, 12 the possible and actual results of this case under copyright law will be compared with results one would expect under the
Chip Act.
Please note that this is a comparison of an actual copyright case
with a hypothetical chip case. In the actual case, the microcode used by
a microprocessor chip is at issue; in the hypothetical case, the physical
design of the chip is at issue.
6. 17 U.S.C. § 910 (Supp. III 1985).
7. H.R. REP. No. 781, supra note 3, at 5, 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS at
5754.
8. Id. at 10-11, 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS at 5759-60. Thus the Chip Act
is a "chip" off the old copyright block.
9. Id. at 8-11, 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS at 5757-60. For the Congressional viewpoint on the choice of an appropriate statutory solution, see Kastenmeier &
Remington, The Semiconductor Chip Protection Act: A Swamp or Firm Ground?, 70
MINN. L. REv. 417 (1985). See also 70 MINN. L. REV. 263-609 (1985) (This entire issue is
devoted to the Chip Act.).
10. See Harris, A Market-OrientedApproach to the Use of Trade Secret or Copyright
Protection (or Both?) for Software, 25 JuRIMEmICS J. 147 (1985).
11. NEC Corp. v. Intel Corp., No. C84-20799 WAI (N.D. Cal., filed Dec. 21, 1984).
NEC's First Amended Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief was filed with the
court Feb. 14, 1985, perhaps in honor of St. Valentine's Day. Intel's Answer and Counterclaim was filed Feb. 26, 1985. Judge William A. Ingram filed his Partial Findings of Fact
and Conclusions of Law on September 22, 1986. NEC Corp. v. Intel Corp., 645 F. Supp.
590 (N.D. Cal. 1986). As of February 1987, the docket was well over thirty-six pages long
with over 500 filings.
12. The Chip Act retroactively protects any chip commercially exploited on or after
July 1, 1983, provided that the chip is registered by July 1, 1985. 17 U.S.C. § 913(d)(1)
(Supp. III 1985). Intel's 8086 and 8088 microcodes were registered in Aug. 1982 and published in 1979 and 1980.
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The market-oriented approach is primarily a response to the abuse
of analogies in the current literature. The Chip Act is, similarly, an alternative to the approach of stretching copyright law to cover problems
resulting from new technologies. The stretching is usually done by
comparing the new technologies to the older passive-observer literary
and artistic forms. Until a distinct body of chip work precedent is developed, however, the courts are encouraged by the legislative history of
13
the Chip Act to use copyright precedent by analogy.
II.

SEMICONDUCTOR TECHNOLOGY
A.

INTEGRATED CIRCUITS

Chips are small devices imprinted on semiconductor material (usually silicon) that constitute an electrical circuit. Because the electrical
circuit is integrated with the semiconductor material, the device is referred to as an integrated circuit.
The chip can contain many types of circuit designs, but two types
are used for computers. These types are memories and microprocessors.
Memories fall into two broad categories: random access memories
(RAM) and read-only memories (ROM). A computer may read information into and out of the RAM; it is an empty container that may be
filled, depleted, or copied from, at will.
A ROM is a closed container. The computer may copy the contents
of a ROM, but the contents may not be altered. The courts have held
that a computer program embedded in a ROM retains any copyright it
may have because the ROM is merely another way to store the program. Thus, in this respect, it is no different from a disk, tape, paper
14
punch, or any other storage medium.
A microprocessor is an integrated circuit that performs the instructions that it is given. Microprocessors often work as the central processing unit (CPU) of computers. Some chips include both microprocessors
and memories, and thus are sufficiently complete to constitute a computer-on-a-chip.
The chip manufacturers design and produce chips to serve a specific
use. Engineers first draft a schematic for the chip. This schematic is
used to create stencils ("masks") which detail the placement of the circuit within each layer of the chip. A master mask is produced. Working masks are made from the master mask. The working masks are
used to etch the circuits onto the semiconductor material via photoli13. H.R. REP. No. 781, supra note 3, at 7-11, 1984 U.S CODE CONG. & ADmiN. NEWS at
5756-60.
14. Apple Computer, Inc. v. Franklin Computer Corp., 714 F.2d 1240 (3d Cir. 1983),
cert. dismissed, 464 U.S. 1033 (1984).

COMPUTER/LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. VII

thography. The layers of etched semiconductor are then stacked to
form a single chip. 15
B.

MICROPROGRAMMING

A chip works like any other electrical circuit. An electrical impulse
runs through the circuit following the path of least resistance. Thus, an
electrical impulse will move down one wire in a chip until it meets another wire. At the intersection of the two wires is a gate. If the gate is
open, the impulse will flow into the second wire. If the gate is closed,
the electrical impulse will not flow into the second wire. The openings
and closings collectively determine the procedure the computer is to
carry out. Several sets of these gate openings may be needed to carry
out one instruction from a higher-level computer language.
The signal which instructs the gate to be open or closed, allowing
the computer to perform a particular task, may be encoded in binary.
Thus, a "0" means the gate is closed, and a "1 means the gate is open.
Therefore, "10011" in a chip that contains five gates mean that the first
gate is open, the second and third gates are closed, and the fourth and
fifth gates are open.
The openings and closings of the gates may be hard-wired into the
chip. This means that each gate in the chip is designed to be permanently opened or closed. Most of the microprocessor chips built today,
however, have soft-wired gates. The gates are opened or closed according to the instructions the chip is given. These instructions are called
microcode. The microcode is stored in a small ROM that is part of the
microprocessor chip. A set of instructions written in microcode is called
a microprogram. The art of programming in microcode is called
microprogramming.
Using a microcode, a chip designer may alter the manner in which
the chip operates after the chip is built. By changing the microcode instruction set, the designer can change the manner in which the chip
works without changing the physical layout of the chip. This results in
16
lower development costs and fewer problems.
ROMs that contain microcode or the object code of a source pro15. This is, of course, a simplification of a more complex procedure. For detailed discussions of the creation and uses of chips, see H.R. REP. No. 781, supra note 3, at 11-13,
1984 U.S CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS at 5760-62; Barker, Copyrightfor IntegratedCircuit
Designs: Will the 1976 Act Protect Against Chip Pirates?,24 S. TEX. L.J. 817, 817-22
(1983). See also, Sci AM., Sept. 1977 (entire issue).
16. Patterson, Microprogramming,Sci. AM., Mar. 1983, at 50. "Besides reducing the
cost of correcting the control system the introduction of microprogramming makes it possible to change the control system completely by changing the total contents of the
microprogram memory. Thus a single hardware system can be made to serve many different functions." Id. at 56.
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gram are classified as firmware; this designates a middle ground between software (instructions programmed by humans) and hardware
17
(physical equipment, including the chips).
Once a chip has been created, its mysteries may be revealed to another person by a process known as reverse engineering. In reverse engineering, a person places the chip under a microscope to read the
circuitry, and may use chemicals to separate the layers. The microcode
embedded on the chip may be read by a special machine in which the
chip is placed. Many researchers and legitimate companies use reverse
engineering to analyze the chip's operation. Unfortunately, reverse engineering is the primary tool for both teaching and piracy of chip architecture. A legitimate company or researcher creates an extensive paper
trail in analyzing a chip, but a pirate merely copies the chip.' 8
The perceived need to continue the use of reverse engineering as a
legitimate tool was one of the factors that motivated Congress to choose
sui generis protection. The statutory allowance for reverse engineering
is one of the features that distinguishes the Chip Act from the Copyright Act. 19
III.

PROVISIONS OF THE CHIP ACT

Although the Chip Act is located in Title 17 of the United States
Code immediately after the Copyright Act, the Chip Act does not preempt or affect other federal intellectual property law. State law is preempted only to the extent that the state law affects mask works and
20
provides similar protection.
A.

DEFINITIONS AND PROCEDURES

The Chip Act protects mask works fixed in semiconductor chip
products. Title 17 section 901(a)(2) 2 1 defines "mask work" as "a series
of related images, however fixed or encoded" which represent the chip.
Section 901(a)(1) defines "semiconductor chip product" as the "final or
intermediate form of any product" made from semiconductor material
"in accordance with a predetermined pattern" that is "intended to perform electronic circuitry functions." Sections 901(a)(3)-(9) define fixation, commercial exploitation, the mask work's "owner" (which is the
17. Id. at 50.
18. H.R. REP. No. 781, supra note 3, at 21-22, 1984 U.S CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWs at
5770-71.
19. See Laurie, NEC v. Inte" Compatibility Constraints and Choices, COMPUTER
LAw., Oct. 1986, at 9.
20. 17 U.S.C. § 912 (Supp. III 1985).
21. All references to code sections are to title 17 of the United States Code (Supp. III
1985), unless otherwise indicated.
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employer in case of a work for hire), "innocent purchaser," "notice of
protection," and "infringing semiconductor chip product." According to
the legislative history, the definition of fixation in section 901(a)(3) is
broad enough to cover data base tapes.
A data base tape contains a digital encoding of the coordinates of
the relevant points in a mask or set of masks. 22 The reason such protection is important is that a pirate with access to a data base tape, a telephone line, and a modem, is able to transmit the contents of that tape
over the telephone line. A mask work may be pirated from Silicon Valley to the Ruhr valley without the pirate ever leaving California or the
premises of the mask work owner.
Despite the legislative history, the Chip Act's definition of fixation
creates some ambiguity as to whether a data base tape is protected. The
key language in section 901(a)(3) is that the fixation must be sufficiently stable to allow the mask work "to be reproduced from the product." Although the data base tape contains sufficient information to
reproduce the product, and is a digital re-creation of the mask work, the
data base tape is not necessarily a "semiconductor chip product" as defined in section 901(a)(1), as it does not have "two or more layers" of
semiconductor material etched to perform the function of electronic circuitry. Until the clause "from the product" can be removed from section 901(a)(3), the best argument that the mask work is sufficiently
fixed in a data base tape is that the tape is an intermediate form of the
product in accordance with the first line of section 901(a)(1), and that
such a reading is consistent with the clearly expressed congressional
intent.
Section 902 defines the subject matter of the protection. If the
owner is a United States national or domiciliary, the protection commences on the date the chip is registered, or is first commercially exploited anywhere in the world, whichever occurs first. The protection
also applies to nationals of a foreign nation which, by treaty, affords reciprocal protection to United States mask works under its national laws.
The President has the power to proclaim reciprocity (without a treaty)
if a foreign country has a national law that gives foreigners and nationals in that nation equal protection under a mask work act substantially
similar to the Chip Act.
Section 903 details ownership, transfer, licensing, and recording
under the Chip Act, and is similar to the provisions of sections 105 and
201 of the Copyright Act. Section 904 limits the duration of protection
to ten years after the work is registered or commercially exploited,
whichever occurs first. Under section 905, the mask work owner has
22.

5766.

H.R. REP. No. 781, supra note 3, at 17, 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS at
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the right to reproduce the mask work, import, or distribute chips, and
cause another to reproduce, import, or distribute the mask work or
chip. The last provision is meant to make contributory infringement an
23
act of infringement.
B. REVERSE ENGINEERING AND INFRINGEMENT
Section 906 allows reverse engineering of a chip for the "purpose of
teaching, analyzing, or evaluating" the chip's design and organization.
Also, the results of such reverse engineering may be incorporated into
another original mask work. 24 The legislative history states that this
provision is similar to fair use under section 107 of the Copyright Act,
but makes it clear that section 107 does not apply to mask works.25 Section 906, however, does carry over the first sale doctrine in section
109(a) of the Copyright Act into section 906(b) of the Chip Act.
Section 907 does not extend liability to innocent infringers. An innocent infringer is liable for reasonable royalties only upon receiving
notice of protection. Prior to receiving notice, an innocent infringer is
immune from liability, and that immunity follows the product to innocent purchasers.
C.

REGISTRATION AND NOTICE

Section 908(a) requires the mask work owner to apply to the Register of Copyrights within two years of the first commercial exploitation
or forfeit the claim. The rest of section 908 discusses the administrative
duties of the Register, who performs an examination similar to that
under copyright law. Registration is prima facie evidence that the facts
contained in the certificate were true and that the applicant has satisfied the Chip Act's requirements and the Register's procedures. Applicants may sue the Register if the application is rejected or if the
26
Register fails to take any action for four months.
Under section 909, an owner has the option of affixing notice of
protection to the mask work and chips. The notice gives no greater protection to the owner per se, but it does constitute prima facie evidence
that the infringer had notice of protection. The notice must have the
name or generally known abbreviation of the mask work owner, plus
23. Id. at 21, 1984 U.S CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS at 5770.
24. For more on reverse engineering, see Fisher, Beyond Fair Use: Reverse Engineering and the Semiconductor Chip Protection Act, COMPUTER LAW., Apr. 1986, at 9; Raskind, Reverse Engineering, Unfair Competition, and Fair Use, 70 MINN. L. REv. 385

(1985).
25. H.R. REP. No. 781, supra note 3, at 21-23, 1984 U.S CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS at

5770-72.
26. 17 U.S.C. § 908(g) (Supp. III 1985).
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the words "mask work," the symbol *M*, or the letter M in a circle. 27
One annoying problem is that in both the United States Code and the
Chip Act's legislative history, section 909(b)(1) reeds "mask force" and
not "mask work." The culprit is probably one of' several transcription
errors in the circulated copy of the Chip Act.28 Whatever the cause, the
Copyright Register makes it clear in its guidelines and registration
'29
forms that the magic words are "mask work.
The enforcement of the owner's rights and remedies are defined in
sections 910-911. The mask work owner or exclusive licensee may sue
the infringer in a civil action. No criminal actions are allowed. There is
no provision for an applicant to sue while the application is pending, but
under section 910(b)(2), the applicant may sue and include a claim
against the Register if the application has been rejected. A reading of
this section with section 908(g) would indicate that an applicant may
sue an infringer after the filing of the application if the Register has not
taken any action for four months.
Upon a finding of infringement, the owner may be awarded actual
damages and given the infringer's profits. The owner need only show
the infringer's gross profits; the infringer must prove any deductions
from the profits or miscalculations by the owner. Any time before a final judgement is reached, the owner has the option of choosing statutory damages not greater than $250,000.00 (as set by the court) instead
of actual damages and profits. The court, at its discretion, may also
award full costs and reasonable attorneys' fees to the prevailing party
pursuant to section 911(f).
D.

RELATION TO OTHIER LAWS

Section 912 lists the relation (or non-relation) of the Chip Act to
other laws. Copyright law is isolated from the Chip Act. In the first
eight chapters of Title 17, any references to "this title" or "title 17" are
deemed not to apply to chapter nine. The legislative history specifically
states that any copyrighted program or writing does not lose its copy30
right protection because it has been embedded in a ROM.
Thus, a copyrighted computer program may be embedded in a chip,
27. Id. § 909(b).
28. The word "symbol" was misspelled in the original as "sumbol." See 17 U.S.C.
§ 909(b)(1).
29. See Copyright Office Regulations, Mask Work Protection, 37 C.F.R. § 211.6 (1986).
The original Interim Regulations of the Copyright Office (reprintedin 1 COPYRIGHT L.J.
112 (1985)) created some controversy with regard to the rule that more than twenty percent of the mask work had to be fixed in an intermediate form to be registerable, and the
manner by which the mask work's "owner" was defined. 1 COPYRIGHT L.J. 141 (1985).
These problems were subsequently solved.
30. H.R. REP. No. 781, supra note 3, at 28, 1984 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News at
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the design of which is protected by the Chip Act. If that chip is part of
an innovative process or invention, the process or invention may be patented. State-created trade secret and unfair competition law may also
be applied at each level. Protection, under the different types of intellectual property law, may be stacked like layers in a chip.
Sections 913-914 list the Chip Act's transitional provisions. One of
these provisions grants power to the Secretary of Commerce, for the
first three years after enactment, to grant mask work protection to nationals of a foreign country if that country is making "good faith efforts
and reasonable progress toward" entering a treaty with the United
States for reciprocal protection or is enacting legislation substantially
similar to the Chip Act. This provision was reputed to have been lobbied for by Japan, which argued that it was making progress towards a
treaty or similar legislation.3 1 In June 1985, the Secretary of Commerce
provided interim protection to Japanese mask works. The protection is
retroactive to November 8, 1984, when the bill was signed into law. Japan's protection was scheduled to terminate in June 1986 with the provision that it would be extended again if Japan continued to make
32
progress on a bill under consideration by the Japanese parliament.
The Secretary of Commerce has subsequently delegated its section
914 authority to the Commissioner of Patents and Trademarks, who has
in turn issued interim orders to protect the mask works of Sweden,
Australia, the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, Canada, and the European Communities. These interim orders have been extended to November 8, 1987.33

IV.

NEC CORPORATION v. INTEL CORPORATION

One case filed in 1984 involves two giants in the semiconductor industry, Intel and NEC. These companies are openly engaged in commercial competition; this is not a question of an underfinanced chip
5777. See also Stem, Preemptionand Relation of SCPA to Other United States Laws, COMPUTER

LAW., Jan. 1985, at 9.

31. Note, Semiconductor Chip Design, 3 COMPUTER L. REP. 518 (1985). A recent re-

port by the Commissioner of Patents and Trademarks to Congress recommends that the
§ 914 authority to issue interim orders be extended past its present expiration date of November 8, 1987. Report Issued on InternationalTransitionalProvisionsof SCPA, 33 PAT.
TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT J. (BNA), No. 806, at 51 (Nov. 20, 1986) [hereinafter Commissioner's Report].
32. ProtectionExtended to JapaneseMask Works, COPYRIGHT L. REP. (CCH) 20,309
at 10,815 (1985).
33. See Commissioner's Report, supra note 31, at 51-52. See also Hart, Questions
Raised on Legally Protecting Semiconductor Chips in the UK, COMPUTER L. & PRAC.,
May-June 1985, at 146.
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pirate selling low-quality imitations on the black market. The stakes
are much higher.
Two of the industry's more successful microprocessors are made by
Intel, an American corporation, and are designated as the 8086 and the
8088. 34 The 8088 chip is used by International Business Machines Corporation (IBM) in the IBM Personal Computer (PC). Intel also sells
these chips to other computer manufacturers who claim that their computers are IBM-compatible. These computers are often referred to as
PC clones. Intel has registered the microcode used in their 8086 and
8088 chips with the Register of Copyrights.3 5 Since the suit was filed,
Intel has marketed more powerful chips, designated the 80286 and
80386, while continuing to market the 8086 and 8088.
NEC is a Japanese concern based in Tokyo. As part of a complete
line of computer hardware, NEC manufactures and markets chips, some
of which are the V20, V30, V40, and V50.3 8 NEC imports the V20 and
V30 chips into the United States via its American subsidiary, NEC Electronics.3 7 The V20 chip has been used to replace the 8088 chip found in
both the PC and its clones.3 8 Intel, however, has claimed that the
microcode used in the NEC "V" series of chips is a copy of the
39
microcode in Intel's 8086 and 8088 chips.
Most of the parties' allegations go to the nature of microcode and
chip design. In its complaint, NEC discusses, at great length, the details
of how its microcode and chip design differ from that of Intel's. NEC's
arguments may be narrowed down to five points: (1) the microcode is
merely a replacement or compromise for hardwired circuitry and thus
should not be considered a computer program; (2) whether the
microcode is a computer program or not, it is a utilitarian item, process,
system, method of operation, or purely functional item; (3) NEC's chips
are different from Intel's chips and, as a result, the microcode is very
different; (4) whether or not the chips are the same, the microcode is
different; and (5) the theory of estoppel, because Intel informed NEC
that it was examining the V20 and V30 for possible copyright infringement, but Intel never followed through.
The first four points raise the issue of what the microcode is and
34. See Intel's Answer and Counterclaim, supra note 11, at 6-7, 22.
35. The registration numbers are TX 988-844 for the 8086 CRCOD, effective Aug. 16,
1982; and, TX 953-801 and TX 953-802 for the 8088 and 8086 microcode sources, respectively, both effective Aug. 27, 1982. Copies of the registrations are appended to Intel's Answer and Counterclaim, supra note 11.
36. See NEC's Complaint, supra note 11, at 2-3,
1-5.
37. Id. at 2-3,
2, 5. The V40 is used to power several PC clones sold in the United
States.

38. Anacker, Affordable Hardware,A.B.A. J., Nov. 1, 1986, at 90.
39. See Intel's Answer and Counterclaim, supra note 11, at 8, 27.
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does. The fifth point, estoppel, is a factual issue beyond the scope of
this Note.
On September 22, 1986, Judge William A. Ingram issued his Partial
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law in which he held that Intel has
"good, valid and existing copyrights on its 8086/8088 microcode."' 4
In
his fifty-four findings of fact and ten conclusions of law, Judge Ingram
held that the function performed by "defendant's 8086/8088
microprograms does not affect their status as copyrightable subject
4
matter." 1
V.

THE APPLICATION OF COPYRIGHT LAW
A.

THE NATURE OF MICROCODE

In 1980, the Copyright Act was amended to define a computer program as "a set of statements or instructions to be used directly or indirectly in a computer in order to bring about a certain result."42 Because
the definition was placed in section 101, the courts have interpreted it as
congressional intent that computer programs be protected. 43 This protection applies whether the program is written in source or object code,
is an applications program or operating system, or is written on a tape,
disk, or embedded in a ROM chip. 44 Unfortunately, the question of
whether the microcode constitutes a computer program under section
101 has never been directly addressed before this case. 45
NEC defines microcode as a structure of the chip's internal circuitry.46 NEC separately defines a machine instruction set as "simply a
list in binary form (i.e., '1's' and '0's') of all the different instructions to
40. 645 F. Supp. at 591.
41. Id. at 595. Several months after Judge Ingram handed down his decision that
microcode is subject to copyright law, a plaintiff in a similar lawsuit added a claim of
microcode copyright infringement by filing an amended complaint. Nat'l Semiconductor
Corp. v. United Microelectronics Corp., No. C86-20762 WAI (N.D. Cal.). See 1987 COMPUTER INDUSTRY LITIGATION REP. (Andrews) 5226, 5267-73.

42. Act of Dec. 12, 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-517, § 10(a), 94 Stat. 3015, 3028 (codified as
amended at 17 U.S.C. § 101 (Supp. III 1985)).
43. Apple Computer, Inc. v. Franklin Computer Corp., 714 F.2d 1240, 1247-49 (3rd Cir.
1983), cet.dismissed, 464 U.S 1033 (1984).
44. Id. at 1249-54.
45. The district court in Apple confused the question of an operating system embedded in a ROM with the hypothetical question of copyrighting "micro-object code" in a
microprocessor chip. Apple Computer, Inc. v. Franklin Computer Corp., 545 F. Supp. 812,
821 n.14 (E.D. Pa. 1983). The Third Circuit disposed of the issue because Apple's testimony showed that the infringed works did not use microcode. "Apple does not seek to
protect the ROM's architecture but only the program encoded upon it." Apple, 714 F.2d at
1249 n.7.
46. See NEC's Complaint, supra note 11, at 4, 10.
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which a particular microprocessor can respond" 47 and as "the building
blocks used to create computer programs." 48 The interface between the
two, according to NEC, is that a machine instruction is "executed in the
microprocessor either directly by means of dedicated hardware circuitry
or by selection of a certain number of steps represented by one or more
lines of microcode. '49 Because the microcode controls the path that the
signal takes in processing the machine instruction, the microcode is not
a program but merely a binary-encoded map of the hardware
circuitry.5°

Intel defines the microcodes as computer programs which "act as
interpreters for the macroinstructions in computer programs which reside outside the microprocessor in ROM, tape or diskettes."'51 The
microcode takes an instruction from an outside program and "interprets
it into an expanded series of microinstructions, and through binary bit
patterns which the microprocessor perceives, directly brings about a
certain result in the microprocessor. '52 This language closely tracks the
definition of a computer program under the 1980 amendment to the
Copyright Act.
Much of the scientific literature refers to microcode as instructions,
which is the word used in the 1980 amendment to the Copyright Act.
As noted above, a set of instructions written in microcode is often called
a microprogram. 53 The 1980 amendments constituted the statutory enactment of the recommendations made by the National Commission on
New Technological Uses of Copyrighted Works ("CONTU").54 According to CONTU, copyright protects the programmer's expression, not the
methods or processes embodied in the programs. 55 The program, therefore, is protected "so long as it remains fixed in a tangible medium of
expression."5 6 Copyright, however, does not protect the "electromechanical functioning of a machine." 57 As a result, "one is always free
to make a machine perform any conceivable process, [however] one is
58
not free to take another's program.
The views expressed in CONTU's report further Intel's position.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.

Id. at 4, 9.
Id. at 4, 11.
Id. at 5, 12.
Id.
See Intel's Answer and Counterclaim, supra note 11, at 3,
Id.
See, e.g., Patterson, supra note 16, at 50.

8.

54. NATIONAL COMMISSION ON NEw TECHNOLOGICAL USES OF COPYRIGHTED WORKS,
FINAL REPORT (1979).

55. rd. at 19-20.
56.

Id. at 20.

57. Id.
58. Id.

1986]

A CHIP OFF THE OLD BLOCK

Although NEC is correct in arguing that the microcode is an alternative
to hardwiring the circuit, the argument is unavailing because copyright
law views microcode as a set of instructions and not as a replacement
for hardwired circuits. 59 Indeed, NEC's argument is similar to the line
of cases prior to Apple Computer, Inc. v. Franklin Computer Corp.,6° in
that it argues that a program is too mechanical to be a literary work.
The adoption of NEC's argument would remove copyright protection
from computer programs. This is because all computer programming is
an alternative to ENIAC, the first computer, which required the physical movement of wires and cables to reprogram it.
B.

SUBSTANTIAL SIMILARITY

Since the decision in Apple v. Franklin,courts have had the task of
construing computer programs in the copyright context. One case, SAS
Inst., Inc. v. S&H Computer Sys., Inc.,6 1 involved the infringement of an
SAS program product. The product, which was designed to operate on
one brand of computer, was copied and adapted by S&H to operate on a
different brand of computer. Among the defenses raised by S&H were
that only a small portion of the product was copied and that the two
products were necessarily different as they operated on two different
machines.
Testimony showed forty-four instances of copying from the SAS
product to the S&H version. The court held that although the quantity
of the copying was neither overwhelming nor insubstantial, the quality
of the sections copied was high. Most of the structure and organization
of the S&H product was stolen from the SAS product. The court also
looked at the conduct of the parties, which showed that S&H had intentionally based their product upon that of SAS. 62 The court also held
that the redesign of the SAS product to operate on a different computer
did not bar a finding that the S&H product was a derivative, and thus
63
infringing, work.
NEC's third argument in its case against Intel, that different chips
necessitate different microcode, is unavailing as it emphasizes the
59. See Harris,Legal Protectionfor Microcode and Beyond, 6 COMPUTER/L.J. 187
(1985).
60. 714 F.2d 1240 (3d Cir. 1983), cert dismissed, 464 U.S. 1033 (1984).
61. SAS Inst., Inc. v. S&H Computer Sys., Inc., 605 F. Supp. 816 (M.D. Tenn. 1985).
See also 1 COPYRIGHT L.J. 126 (1985).
62. SAS Inst., 605 F. Supp. at 831. See also E.F. Johnson Co. v. Uniden Corp. of
America, 623 F. Supp. 1485 (D. Minn. 1985) (discussed with regard to the court's use of the
"iterative approach" of determining substantial similarity at 2 COPYRIGHT L.J. 76 (1986)).
63. SAS Inst., 605 F. Supp. at 831. See also Whelan Assoc., Inc. v. Jaslow Dental Laboratory, Inc., 609 F. Supp. 1307 (E.D. Pa. 1985), qff'd, 797 F.2d 1222 (3d Cir. 1986), cert denied, 107 S. Ct. 877 (1987).
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wrong factor. As in SAS v. S&H, the programs, and not the machines
on which they run, are compared. This leads into NEC's fourth argument, that NEC's microcode is not substantially similar to Intel's
microcode. It then becomes a question of fact as to whether the similarities in instructions, starting addresses, and overall organization, as alleged by Intel, are sufficient for a finding of infringement.
C.

CONCLUSIONS UNDER COPYRIGHT LAW

A microcode comes under the definition of a computer program in
section 101. In the NEC case, if only a few instructions had been encoded in ROM, then there might have been too few to create a full program. The pleadings, however, show a large and substantial microcode
instruction set.
NEC's best remaining argument is that under the facts no infringement occurred. Estoppel has also been asserted as a defense, although
not discussed in this Note.
VI.

THE RESULTS UNDER THE CHIP ACT

Prior to the Chip Act, many commentators argued that copyright
law could or should protect the chip masks and schematics. 64 Other
commentators argued that copyrighting a chip's mask is merely a
shabby attempt at copyrighting the chip, and thus should not be allowed.6 5 Those who argued that a copyright did protect the schematics
and mask usually noted that protecting the mask did not protect the
chip itself.6
Intel once filed masks of its 8755 microprocessor with the Register
of Copyrights. Intel also tried to deposit an 8755 chip as a copy of the
published form of the masks, but the Register refused the chip. Intel
sued, but the parties settled before trial. The masks were registered
and the chip was placed in the file with the masks, but the chip was not
67
accepted as the published form of the mask.
Under the Chip Act, Intel could sue for infringement of the mask
words. 68 Intel could still sue for infringement of the microcode as a separate count under copyright law. The tests of substantial similarity as
64. See, e.g., Barker, supra note 15, at 832-42; Davidson, Protecting Computer Software: A Comprehensive Analysis, 1983 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 611, 706-11. Davidson looks to see
how the microcode is authored to determine whether it is protected under copyright law
or not.
65. Petraske, Copyright for Machines-An Oxymoron, 65 J. PAT. OFF. SOC'Y 410
(1983).
66. Barker, supra note 15, at 842.
67. Intel Corp. v. Ringer, No. C-77-2848 RHS (N.D. Cal., filed Apr. 13, 1978) (dismissed by stipulation), reported in Barker, supra note 15, at 842.
68. See Becker, Legal Protection of Semiconductor Mask Works in the United States,
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developed under copyright law would apply to both claims until a test
specific to the Chip Act, the test of "substantial identity," is developed
69
and used.
CONCLUSION
The Semiconductor Chip Protection Act appears to be the right
statute at the right time. Several problems need to be eliminated from
the statute. It is expected that some of the judicial interpretation
problems that have plagued computer cases in the past will be resolved
as judges more familiar with the technology are appointed. 70 Nevertheless, most of the parties involved (except the pirates) should be happy
with the Chip Act. One may expect that the Founding Fathers would
have been proud.
While many commentators argue that the success of the Chip Act is
71
the best argument for sui generis protection of computer software, it
is unlikely that Congress, or the computer software houses will work
toward a new statute to protect software. The computer industry has
expended too much time and money to hammer the copyright law into
its present state. The industry knows the limitations of copyright protection, even though the boundaries are still unclear. Congress, having
labored to create the Chip Act to appease one segment of the computer
industry, is unwilling to start over in order to appease another segment
of the same industry that recently requested and received amendments
to the Copyright Act. To fully realize the potential of the Chip Act,
however, Congress will need to remove computer software, including
microcode, from the ambit of the Copyright Act, and place it in a sui
generis statute so that plaintiffs do not rely primarily on the broader
protection of the Copyright Act.
The argument that computer programs, micro or macro, are nothing more than extensions of a computer's electronic circuitry and are
thus uncopyrightable will never be eliminated. This argument has been
employed, without success, by NEC in NEC v. Intel, by S&H in SAS v.
S&H, by Franklin in Apple v. Franklin, and to a lesser degree by Jaslow in Whelan v. Jaslow.72 The creation of software is equally analogous to the writing of a "how-to" book and the drawing of an electronic
6 COMPUTER/L.J. 589 (1985); Stern, Determining Liability for Infringement of Mask
Work Rights Under the Semiconductor Chip ProtectionAct, 70 MINN. L. REV. 271 (1985).
69. See Current Developments in Computer Law Eplored, 33 PAT. TRADEMARK &
COPYRIGHT J. (BNA) 435, 435-36 (1987).
70. See, Elman, A Personal View of the Whelan v. Jaslow Appellate ArgumentsFifty More Minutes on Software Copyright, 4 COMPuTER L. REP. 840 (1986).
71. See, Samuelson, Creatinga New Kind of Intellectual Property: Applying the Lessons of the Chip Law to Computer Programs,70 MiN N. L. REv. 471 (1985).
72. See Harris, supra note 59.
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schematic. The problem remains that a computer becomes a different
machine for each program that controls it, yet each of these machines
creates a different environment for those who use the computer. The
Chip Act teaches that it is better to create a new solution for a new
problem than to stretch an old solution out of shape.
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